Some More WikiWar News

Wikipedia

Wikipedia

As a keen observer of both politics and technology I have spent the last decade and more watching the rise of the internet proxy wars that have flared up across the world wide web and in particular on sites like Wikipedia. The collective online encyclopaedia has become something of a new “high ground” in the information wars for numerous national- and non-national players around the globe. So it is no surprise that representatives of both Irish and British Nationalism (and sympathetic allies or observers on both sides) have made the migration to this new battleground. However what makes the internet all the more interesting is the manner in which one person can actually make a difference (just Google the term “Anglophone supremacist” to see why). Information is power and to control the main sources of information is to wield that power. And Wikipedia is certainly an exemplar of that.

So I’d thought I’d feature the “Talk” page of the English language Wikipedia entry for the Irish village of An Mhagh or Muff/Eglinton in County Derry. It represents a fascinating online microcosm of the greater struggle for Irish freedom, even in the most seemingly innocuous of things. And the determination of individuals to compete for the control of the online sources of information.

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Improvised Warfare In Syria

The Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad

The Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad

Two recommended reads on the conflict in Syria. The first is a photo-easy from The Atlantic highlighting the use of (very) improvised weaponry by the anti-Al Assad insurgents, while the second from the London Review of Books takes an insider’s look at the fractious nature of the insurgency. Can I also recommend a related series of posts from the Brown Moses Blog which examine in detail the wide range of munitions deployed by the insurgency and the Syrian military. The various state and non-state “actors” at play behind the scenes in the civil war in Syria are frequently revealed through the weapons in use by the several sides in the conflict.

For instance the video below, published to YouTube, seems to show the downing of a Syrian military Mil Mi-17, the export designation of the Russian-made Mi-8M helicopter, through the use of an unknown type of MANPAD (man-portable air-defence system – what used to be popularly known as a SAM missile). It’s been suggested that the weapon in question is an FN-6, China’s base anti-aircraft missile system, which has been supplied both to Pakistan and Sudan.

More Accounts Of Death Squad Britain

General Sir Frank Kitson, the British Army's death squad supremo in Ireland during the 1970s

General Sir Frank Kitson, the British Army’s death squad supremo in Ireland during the 1970s

Veteran Irish journalist and author Ed Moloney and his colleague Bob Mitchell continue their investigations into the Military Reaction Force (MRF), a British Army death squad that operated in the north-east of Ireland during the early 1970s. Its notoriety and reckless nature (with carloads of heavily armed undercover soldiers carrying out random drive-by shootings of the civilian populace in the city of Belfast) eventually led to its replacement with a number of other covert groups including the infamous Force Research Unit or FRU. By examining the 1972 attempted assassination of Brendan Hughes, Officer Commanding D Company, 2nd Battalion, Belfast Brigade of the Irish Republican Army (and widely regarded as one of the most effective and thoughtful field commanders of his generation), Moloney and Mitchell have uncovered new evidence of the British Army’s modus operandi during the early years of the war in the North of Ireland. Evidence which corroborates Brendan Hughes own testimony of events from that time.

The military mastermind behind the introduction of the MRF and other covert units was the British death squad supremo, General Sir Frank Kitson GBE, KCB, MC & Bar, DL. On the basis of his “successes” in Ireland he rose to become Commander-in-Chief of the British Land Forces and Aide-de-Camp to the British head of state in the 1980s. In this BBC news-documentary from 1975 examining “war gaming” exercises Kitson can be viewed in action. The nature of the exercise, as described by the BBC Panorama programme, show that the concerns and ambitions of the British Army leadership in the 1970s ran far beyond the conflict in Ireland:

“Filmed at the height of the troubles in Northern Ireland, this programme offers a fascinating insight into officer training. Six years in Northern Ireland have given the British Army unique experience in counter insurgency and internal security techniques. Sandhurst recognises that the Army’s Ulster experience could – one day – have to be used in Britain, and there is a need to train officers for that possibility. So imagine a world where Scotland has left the United Kingdom, where some English cities are thinking of following suit and where law and order is breaking down in our towns. It may seem far fetched, but the recruits of Sandhurst are presented with just such a scenario.”

If you have difficulty viewing the documentary due to your location try installing Tor on your device (video guide here). The new investigation by Ed Moloney and Bob Mitchell, using redacted British military records, can be read in full here.

UPDATE: Here is the BBC 1975 Panorama documentary featuring Kitson, via YouTube (indirect link I’m afraid).

Seanchas – Irish, Scottish And Manx Mythology And Folklore

Cairn Loch Craobh, Sliabh na Caillí, Loch Craobh, An Mhí, Éire, Meitheamh 2009 (Photo: Séamas Ó Sionnaigh)

Cairn Loch Craobh, Sliabh na Caillí, Loch Craobh, An Mhí, Éire, Meitheamh 2009 (Photo: Séamas Ó Sionnaigh)

For those of you with an interest in early, middle and early modern indigenous Irish literature and post-Medieval folklore (Irish and Anglicised-Irish), here is a collection of my articles, long and short (though two are unfinished). Naturally it covers the national traditions of Scotland and the Isle of Man too.

Tuatha Dé Danann
Na Fomhóraigh
Lucharacháin
An Sí
Na Fathaigh
Na Bocánaigh, Na Bánánaigh
Na Púcaí
Na Péisteanna
Na Murúcha
Seanchas Agus Litríocht na nGael
Na Fianna

Of course some may prefer the Hellboy version of these things…

 

Inside The IRA – 1994

Inside The IRA (Image: Rory Nugent, Spin Magazine, 1994)

Inside The IRA (Image: Rory Nugent, Spin Magazine, 1994)

How things have changed in the last 19 years – and how much they have stayed the same. In 1994 the American writer and journalist Rory Nugent was “embedded” for Spin Magazine with an Active Service Unit of the Irish Republican Army in the Occupied North of Ireland, from December 1993 to April 1994. The British government was so infuriated by the story that they issued an arrest warrant for the editor of the US-based publication.

The link to the original magazine article is here, “Inside The IRA” (page 64). It is a timely reminder of why politics must be made to work.

(Note: the video above is a low-quality version of copyrighted footage shot by the journalist Rory Nugent while writing a piece for Spin Magazine on the Irish Republican Army in 1994. The version shown here is used with permission)

US Army Training Circular TC 18-01, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare

French soldier pictured in Mali, 2013

Thought some of you might be interested in this given the recent events in Libya, Syria and now Mali. The November 30, 2010 revision of the US Army Training Circular “TC 18-01, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare“. You can download it here in PDF format (verified virus free).

TC 18-01 

CONTENTS

Chapter 1 OVERVIEW . 1-1
Introduction to Unconventional Warfare 1-1
The Role of Unconventional Warfare in United States National Strategy . 1-2
Feasibility for United States Sponsorship . 1-3
Physical and Human Environmental Conditions . 1-3
Resistance Movement Characteristics . 1-5
The Criticality of the Feasibility Assessment . 1-6
Ways the United States Conducts Unconventional Warfare . 1-7
The Seven Phases of Unconventional Warfare 1-8
Elements in Unconventional Warfare 1-9

Chapter 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF RESISTANCE AND INSURGENCY 2-1
Why Populations Resist 2-1
Dynamics of Successful Insurgencies. 2-3
The Components of an Insurgency . 2-8
Additional Elements of an Insurgency . 2-12
Infrastructure of a Resistance Movement or Insurgency 2-13
Organization of Medical Support Within the Area Complex 2-17
Insurgent Support Networks 2-18

Chapter 3 CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT 3-1
Planning for Unconventional Warfare . 3-1
Seven Phases of Unconventional Warfare . 3-2
Civil Affairs Support to the Seven Phases of Unconventional Warfare 3-8
Logistics Considerations . 3-9
Supply Considerations 3-10
Command and Control 3-13
Legal Principles . 3-15

Appendix A AREA STUDY . A-1
Appendix B SPECIAL FORCES AREA ASSESSMENT . B-1
Appendix C SAMPLE TRAINING PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION
FOR RESISTANCE FORCES C-1
Appendix D SPECIAL FORCES CACHING. D-1

GLOSSARY . Glossary-1

REFERENCES . References-1

INDEX Index-1

Figures
Figure 1-1. Unconventional warfare terminology . 1-2
Figure 1-2. Support for an insurgency . 1-4
Figure 1-3. Phases of unconventional warfare 1-9
Figure 2-1. Resistance terminology . 2-2
Figure 2-2. Structure of an insurgency or resistance movement . 2-4
Figure 2-3. Operational cell 2-9
Figure 2-4. Intelligence cell 2-9
Figure 2-5. Parallel cells 2-10
Figure 2-6. Auxiliary cell . 2-11
Figure 2-7. Cells in series 2-11
Figure 2-8. Resistance structure with government-in-exile . 2-13
Figure 2-9. Area complex. 2-14
Figure 2-10. Permanent base security. 2-15
Figure 3-1. Unconventional warfare elements . 3-2
Figure A-1. Area study outline format A-1
Figure B-1. Sample principal assessment . B-1
Figure C-1. Sample master training plan for 30-day leadership course . C-1
Figure C-2. Sample master training plan for 10-day leadership course . C-2
Figure C-3. Data card—personnel and training record . C-4

Tables
Table D-1. Buoyancy chart D-16

Related articles

Britain’s War In Ireland – Learning The Lessons

Bloody Sunday Massacre, Derry, Ireland, 1972

Bloody Sunday Massacre, Derry, Ireland, 1972

The Irish journalist and author Finian Cunningham examines the conflict in the north-east of Ireland during the late 1960s and early ‘70s and draws some lessons in relation to France’s present military intervention in Mali. His description of the origins and early years of the Northern War are particularly noteworthy:

“This week sees the anniversary of one of the worst massacres in modern Irish history, when British paratroopers murdered 14 unarmed civilians in cold blood.

On 30 January 1972, the British troops opened fire on a civil rights march in Derry City, Northern Ireland’s second city after Belfast, in full glare of the international news media.

Half of the victims that day were teenagers, shot in the head or in the back by British snipers. Some of the fatally wounded were shot multiple times as they tried to crawl to safety. Others were cut down in a hail of bullets as they tended to those lying wounded, bleeding on the ground.

One iconic image from that horrific day shows a Catholic priest, Fr Edward Daly, holding up a bloodstained white cloth, pleading with the British soldiers to cease-fire as he helped carry a dying youth.

Bloody Sunday, as it became known, was a watershed event. From then on, the conflict in Northern Ireland exploded. Some 3,000 people would lose their lives in the ensuing decades of violence – a huge death toll for the tiny population, equivalent to 240,000 in Iran or 900,000 in the United States.

Many Irish citizens, outraged by the British army slaughter, went on to join the ranks of the newly formed Provisional Irish Republican Army, the armed guerrilla movement that would kill hundreds of British troops and police and take the war to the very streets of London, with massive bombing campaigns in the British capital and other major cities.

Prior to the arrival of the British troops, the British-controlled Northern Ireland saw an outbreak of violence in the summer of 1968 when Nationalists began agitating for equal civil rights under the corrupt pro-British Unionist administration. Peaceful demonstrations by Nationalists were subsequently attacked by Unionist gangs and paramilitaries, aided and abetted by the sectarian state police force. Many civilians were killed as Nationalist communities were shot at and burned out of their homes and workplaces in reprisals over their political demands.

The Unionist-dominated province of Northern Ireland brought international disgrace to the United Kingdom, and the London government was obliged to post thousands of British soldiers “to restore order”. At first, Nationalist communities welcomed the British troops when they were deployed in August 1969, believing the army to be affording protection from marauding Unionist paramilitaries and police.

When the British army went into Northern Ireland in 1969, it soon became apparent that the intervention had nothing to do with protecting Nationalist civilians, under the boot of the Unionist statelet, and everything to do with suppressing the political challenge being posed by Irish separatism, which wanted to dismantle the British partition of Ireland and to create a united, independent country, free from London’s political control.

The pretext used by London for despatching troops to Northern Ireland concealed its real purpose. That agenda was to target the Nationalist population with state terrorism for political ends. Whereas in previous years, the Unionist paramilitaries could rely on the collusion of the local police force to terrorise, from 1969 onwards these forces had the full might of the British army to ramp up the violence against Nationalist civilians and thereby intimidate them from supporting political opposition to the British government’s presence in Ireland.

The year before Bloody Sunday, in August 1971, British paratroopers shot dead 11 unarmed civilians in the Ballymurphy area of West Belfast. Among the dead was a 50-year-old woman, Joan Connolly, who had been standing peacefully on the street. Another victim was a priest, Fr. Hugh Mullan, who was shot dead while trying to assist a man wounded on the ground. [ASF: Click on the link for more on the Ballymurphy Massacre]

On 9 July 1972 – six months after Bloody Sunday – British troops again shot dead five unarmed Nationalist civilians in another area of West Belfast, Springhill. Three of the victims were children, including 13-year-old Margaret Gargan, who was shot in the head by a British sniper as she was walking to her home. The two adults who died that day, Patrick Butler and Fr. Noel Fitzpatrick, were killed with the same bullet, it ripping through one man’s head into the other. One of the survivors of the Springhill massacre later told how, as he lay wounded, bullets were ricocheting off the ground near his head, fired by British soldiers who had taken up position in a nearby timber yard that overlooked the residential neighbourhood.

On another occasion during that year, a friend of this author told how when he was only a young boy he witnessed his father and a neighbour being shot at by British troops, while they were painting the family home in West Belfast. The neighbour was blown off the ladder when a high-velocity round slammed into his upper leg. It was fired by British soldiers dug in a couple of kilometres away on the Black Mountain looking down on the housing estate. Just one of countless acts of gratuitous violence committed against the civilian population by British troops.

During these gun attacks on Nationalist communities, the British army would often work hand-in-glove with Unionist paramilitaries, or death squads, as they fired into family homes, indiscriminately killing the occupants. That secret policy of collusion between British forces and Unionist death squads would later be refined with even more deadly impact.

It should be noted that this wanton state terrorism by British forces was taking place in a part of the United Kingdom, where there was supposedly the rule of law, human rights and due process.”

 

Bloody Sunday Massacre, Derry, Ireland, 1972

Bloody Sunday Massacre, Derry, Ireland, 1972

Counter-Gangs – The Origins Of British Terrorism In Ireland

12 year old Maria McGurk, murdered by British state-controlled terrorists in 1971 at McGurk's Bar, Belfast, Ireland. Another victim of Britain's dirty war in Ireland.

12 year old Maria McGurk, murdered by British state-controlled terrorists in 1971 at McGurk’s Bar, Belfast, Ireland. Another victim of Britain’s dirty war in Ireland.

I’ve devoted considerable space on An Sionnach Fionn to cataloguing Britain’s dirty war in Ireland highlighting a wide range of evidence gathered over the last forty years by human rights organisations, journalists and historians. Now the independent news and current affairs site Spinwatch has worked with the Pat Finucane Centre to publish a new study, “COUNTER-GANGS: A history of undercover military units in Northern Ireland 1971-1976“, a comprehensive investigation into the origins of British state-terrorism in Ireland.

The author of COUNTER-GANGS is Margaret Urwin, the secretary of Justice for the Forgotten, a branch of the Pat Finucane Centre which works with victims of Britain’s bombing campaigns in Ireland during the 1970s. Her report is based on years of work including interviews with former members of the British military and intelligence services and extensive documentary research. The publication presents evidence proving:

  • that senior British Army officers stationed in the North of Ireland during the early years of the conflict developed close contacts with various British terrorist factions in Ireland as part of a wider counter-insurgency war against the Irish Republican Army and Irish civilian population in general.
  • that the British Army created a special forces intelligence group, the Military Reaction Forces (MRF), in late 1971 and that the public exposure of the MRF as a death squad led to their replacement a year later by a larger organisation: the Special Reconnaissance Unit (SRU).
  • that the SRU relied heavily on members of the Special Air Service (SAS) for special forces manpower. Successive British governments went to enormous lengths to conceal this fact from the British parliament and media, denying the role of SAS death squads in Ireland.
  • that deliberately misleading information about British special forces and intelligence units in Ireland was fed to the British and international press as part of a black propaganda campaign. One resulting media story included information that would have enabled the Irish Republican Army to identify Louis Hammond as an MRF agent in their ranks. Hammond was shot shortly afterwards.

The report is the first of the State Violence and Collusion Project, an online research collaboration between SpinWatch and the Pat Finucane Centre, established with funding from the respected British-based Scurrah Wainwright Charity.

For more information please download the free PDF booklet “COUNTER-GANGS: A history of undercover military units in Northern Ireland 1971-1976” (verified virus-free). I also recommend the use of the independent wiki Power Base for more to the background of Britain’s thirty-year war in Ireland.

Lessons From The First Chechen War

afghanistan

Afghanistan

For military analysts like myself the two most interesting conflicts of the last twenty years have been the First Chechen War of 1994-1996 and the Second Lebanese War of 2006. In the former conflict the tiny Chechen Republic of Ichkeria found itself taking on the decaying colossus of the Russian Federation in the aftermath of the collapse of the old Soviet Union. Despite the received wisdom of popular myth guerrilla armies do not always defeat regular armies, no matter how lengthy the conflict. In fact more often than not it is the irregular forces that succumb in one form or another, unless they manage to gain support from significant backers, invariably meaning a nation-state or states.

The United States lost in Vietnam because of the political, military and financial backing for the Viet Cong guerrillas and party in the south by the government of North Vietnam as well as the USSR and the Peoples Republic of China. The USSR was defeated in Afghanistan because of the support for the Mujahideen that flowed from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Britain and China. Likewise the support from Iran for the insurgency in Iraq was a major cause of the precipitous withdrawal of Coalition forces there.The evolving “defeat” (or at least “drawdown”) of NATO-led forces in Afghanistan was and is in part due to the backing of the Taliban / anti-Kabul forces by Pakistan and latterly Iran.

Without a national backer most historic insurgencies simply fizzle out. A notable exception is to be found in Ireland’s War of Independence which was fought by the revolutionary Irish Republic through Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the British Empire as a whole. Despite considerable sympathy around the globe, especially in the United States, Australia, France, Germany and Italy, very little direct aid was supplied to the Irish cause, and none from government sources. Instead the Irish Revolution was largely self reliant and self-sustaining, with help from individual Irish emigrant communities overseas, making its (partial) success all the more remarkable.

In contrast both the Chechen and Lebanese wars mentioned above relied on the succour of one or more nation-states to succeed. The Chechen guerillas had at their core the resources of their former Republic and initially the struggle was fought between two conventional military forces. They also had sympathetic neighbouring states, at least in the early stages of the conflict. When the Israeli Defence Forces or IDF invaded (or was lured into) southern Lebanon in July of 2006 it found itself confronted by Islamic Resistance, the military wing of Hezbollah, a nominally guerilla grouping. However thanks to the military and financial aid supplied by the Islamic Republic of Iran the Israelis were delivered a series of tactical defeats by a force that bordered the line between irregular and regular eventually producing something of an ignoble retreat by Israel.

The links below lead to PDF downloads of chapters from “Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat“ by Olga Oliker for the RAND Corporation. They present a detailed military and political analysis of the failures (and successes)  surrounding Russia’s military expeditions in Chechnya.

Contents:

  • Preface PDF
  • Figures PDF
  • Summary PDF
  • Acknowledgments PDF
  • Glossary PDF
  • Chapter 1 Introduction PDF
  • Chapter 2 Grozny I: 1994-1995 PDF
  • Chapter 3 Return to Grozny: 1999-2000 PDF
  • Chapter 4 Conclusions PDF
  • Bibliography PDF

In Defence Of Israel

Israeli soldiers pray before a Torah, southern Israel, 2012 (AP Photo – Ariel Schalit)

I’ve always admired the state of Israel and the Israeli people as a whole. From an Irish point of view the historic parallels between our nations are obvious. Both share a sense of ethnicity and cultural continuity that reach into a far distant past, with roots that are of greater import than any transient political or ideological beliefs. There is a depth to my own identity, to my Celticness, that I recognise in Jewish and Israeli friends. Reflections of it can be glimpsed in the works of writers, poets and artists from both peoples. And in the intellectual underpinnings of our revolutionaries too. Yet, as the years have passed, it has become harder and harder to sustain that admiration for Israel.

A certain embarrassment has overcome those of us on the Left who speak up for Israel, who defend it’s re-foundation and right to exist. There is a feeling of awkwardness, almost shame, to find oneself in the company of some less than savoury characters or ideologues who express similar views (albeit in less nuanced or more bellicose terms). To be associated with some Fox News “journalist”, however tangentially, on the issue of Israel is enough to make your skin crawl.

The actions and attitudes of the Israeli state itself have moved far away from the centre-left and secularist impulses of many of its founding members. Today one increasingly perceives an Israel that is only marginally different in composition to the countries which surround it. When I watch a video of Israeli soldiers standing and praying before a military rabbi holding up a torah I find it hard to distinguish them from their Palestinian counterparts. They look the same, they pray the same, their languages and accents sound the same… yet we are told they are not the same.

Now we have a ceasefire after the latest ramping up of the conflict in that part of Occupied Palestine known as the Gaza Strip and it is hard to disagree with this summation from professor John J. Mearsheimer in, of all places, The American Conservative:

“…when a ceasefire comes, Israel will declare victory. Don’t believe it. Israel has foolishly started another war it cannot win.

The campaign in Gaza is said to have two objectives: 1) to put an end to the rockets and mortars that Palestinians have been firing into southern Israel since it withdrew from Gaza in August 2005; 2) to restore Israel’s deterrent, which was said to be diminished by the Lebanon fiasco, by Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, and by its inability to halt Iran’s nuclear program.

But these are not the real goals… The actual purpose is connected to Israel’s long-term vision of how it intends to live with millions of Palestinians in its midst. It is part of a broader strategic goal: the creation of a “Greater Israel.” Specifically, Israel’s leaders remain determined to control all of what used to be known as Mandate Palestine, which includes Gaza and the West Bank. The Palestinians would have limited autonomy in a handful of disconnected and economically crippled enclaves, one of which is Gaza. Israel would control the borders around them, movement between them, the air above and the water below them.

The key to achieving this is to inflict massive pain on the Palestinians so that they come to accept the fact that they are a defeated people and that Israel will be largely responsible for controlling their future. This strategy, which was first articulated by Ze’ev Jabotinsky in the 1920s and has heavily influenced Israeli policy since 1948, is commonly referred to as the “Iron Wall.”

What has been happening in Gaza is fully consistent with this strategy.

If Israel wanted to stop missile attacks from Gaza, it could have done so by arranging a long-term ceasefire with Hamas. And if Israel were genuinely interested in creating a viable Palestinian state, it could have worked with the national unity government to implement a meaningful ceasefire and change Hamas’s thinking about a two-state solution. But Israel has a different agenda: it is determined to employ the Iron Wall strategy to get the Palestinians in Gaza to accept their fate as hapless subjects of a Greater Israel.

This brutal policy is clearly reflected in Israel’s conduct of the Gaza War. Israel and its supporters claim that the IDF is going to great lengths to avoid civilian casualties…

The best evidence, however, that Israel is deliberately seeking to punish the broader population in Gaza is the death and destruction the IDF has wrought on that small piece of real estate…

… Israel is unlikely to stop the rocket fire for any appreciable period of time unless it agrees to open Gaza’s borders and stop arresting and killing Palestinians. Israelis talk about cutting off the supply of rockets and mortars into Gaza, but weapons will continue to come in via secret tunnels and ships that sneak through Israel’s naval blockade. It will also be impossible to police all of the goods sent into Gaza through legitimate channels.

Israel could try to conquer all of Gaza and lock the place down. That would probably stop the rocket attacks if Israel deployed a large enough force. But then the IDF would be bogged down in a costly occupation against a deeply hostile population. They would eventually have to leave, and the rocket fire would resume. And if Israel fails to stop the rocket fire and keep it stopped, as seems likely, its deterrent will be diminished, not strengthened.

More importantly, there is little reason to think that the Israelis can beat Hamas into submission and get the Palestinians to live quietly in a handful of Bantustans inside Greater Israel. Israel has been humiliating, torturing, and killing Palestinians in the Occupied Territories since 1967 and has not come close to cowing them. Indeed, Hamas’s reaction to Israel’s brutality seems to lend credence to Nietzsche’s remark that what does not kill you makes you stronger.

But even if the unexpected happens and the Palestinians cave, Israel would still lose because it will become an apartheid state. As Prime Minister Ehud Olmert recently said, Israel will “face a South African-style struggle” if the Palestinians do not get a viable state of their own. “As soon as that happens,” he argued, “the state of Israel is finished.” Yet Olmert has done nothing to stop settlement expansion and create a viable Palestinian state, relying instead on the Iron Wall strategy to deal with the Palestinians.

The bottom line is that no matter what happens on the battlefield, Israel cannot win its war in Gaza. In fact, it is pursuing a strategy-with lots of help from its so-called friends in the Diaspora-that is placing its long-term future at risk.”

The article above was published on January 26th, 2009, after the first “Gaza war”.

Do I need say more?

Britain’s Irish Civil War

Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army move through Grafton Street, the Battle of Dublin, 1922

In my 2011 review of historian Liz Gillis’ new Irish Civil War study “The Fall of Dublin” from Mercier Press I wrote that:

“…one of the accusations made by some Republicans in the aftermath of the Fall of Dublin was the use of British troops  in the assaults on the Republican forces entrenched in the city. Certainly this is given some credence in a paragraph by Gillis describing a mutiny of Pro-Treaty soldiers at Portobello Barracks:

‘Frank Carney, supplies officer at the barracks, was ordered to hand over weapons and other materials that were to be used in the assault:

He was about to obey the order when he recognised the officer receiving them as a British officer from the Phoenix Park depot [the British Army HQ]. Realising it was an alliance with British against Republicans that he was being called upon to take action, he refused to comply and resigned. Several men resigned with him and all were placed under arrest.’

However there is little other evidence of direct involvement by the British Forces in the fighting, though British troops were kept at the ready in bases around the city to intervene if need be and the British provided the artillery, heavy machine guns and armoured vehicles that the Free State forces used to swing the battle in their favour. Further offers from the British including the use of warplanes to bomb and strafe Republican positions were rejected. But later in the war direct British military assistance, particularly from the Royal Navy, was accepted so perhaps British ‘advisers’ were present during the battles at the Four Courts and maybe elsewhere? Certainly as the war progressed the Free State army increasingly resembled a ‘demobbed’ British Army in Ireland.”

Now new evidence has emerged to prove that the British Occupation Forces in Ireland did participate directly in the earliest stages of the Civil War. Indeed they played a pivotal role in the events that were to propel Ireland into the internecine conflict that was to scar the country for generations to come. First comes an article from Irish Central describing a new BBC radio documentary revealing the memoirs of Lance-Bombardier Percy Creek, a British soldier who served in Ireland during the Revolution:

“A newly discovered military memoir has claimed that British Army artillery crews were commandeered by Michael Collins at the start of the Irish Civil War.

The claim contradicts official accounts that Collins turned down an offer of soldiers and artillery from the British to end the three month occupation of the Four Courts by anti-treaty forces.

The claims have been broadcast by the BBC in Britain in a radio programme featuring the memoir of Lance Bombardier Percy Creek of the Royal Field Artillery.

His book was discovered by Open University academic William Sheehan and broadcast by BBC Radio 4’s Document series.

The Irish Times reports that Creek claims in the book how his unit of howitzer artillery was sent to Fermanagh, but later told to march by night to Dublin and ‘told not to speak to anyone and to keep as quiet as possible.’

The Irish National Army had failed up to then to disperse the anti-treaty forces occupying the Four Courts under the command of Rory O’Connor.

The Irish Army’s shrapnel blasts proved ineffective which is why, Creek claims, his unit was given the orders to fire two heavy rounds.

He recalled: “We then saw the shell rip into a wall of one of the courts. Then, all became quiet and I think the officers and dignitaries were all very tense.

“We only fired two rounds and quickly limbered up and went back to the rest of the battery. The situation in Dublin was very tricky.”

The broadcast recalled how Creek’s sergeant and commanding officer were worried beforehand because of the presence of Irish soldiers in the Royal Field Artillery unit.

He said: “A few days later we went to some docks and the whole battery was shipped back to Fishguard.”

Historian William Sheehan told The Irish Times that the Creek memoir is significant. He said: “It shows that the agenda was being driven by the British cabinet in London.

“Ministers there, including Winston Churchill, were concerned that anti-Treaty forces in Munster and elsewhere would mobilise to surround the National Army troops encircling the Four Courts.

The Nottingham-based academic added: “Collins was not a victim, but there is evidence that he was certainly not in control of what was going on around him. He’s choiceless. He is essentially doing what the British wanted.”

Collins’s biographer Tim Pat Coogan told the BBC programme he did not know if Creek’s version of events was accurate, but ‘it could have happened.’

University of Dundee professor Dr John Regan told the BBC that the account ‘complicates things’. He said: “It suggests that the British were there for the opening shots of the Irish Civil War.””

Soldiers of the Irish National Army (Free State Army) with British-supplied uniforms, weapons and equipment, the Battle of Dublin, 1922

Creek’s testimonial has now been given greater weight with collaborative proof from British government files, as detailed in an article from today’s Irish Times newspaper:

“Lance-Bombardier Percy Creek had no intention of trying to overturn one of the State’s foundation stones when he sat down decades afterward to write of his time in the British army.

Last week sections of his memoir were published. In these he claimed that he and other British gunners were employed to shell the Four Courts in the opening chapter of the Civil War.

Despite the rumours then, and later, it had always been generally accepted that Michael Collins used British equipment and ammunition, but not troops. Creek’s account calls into question this version of history, however. Despite Creek’s doubters last week, and there were many, his account is backed by British cabinet minutes from late June 1922.

Open University academic William F Sheehan, formerly of University College, Cork, examined the cabinet papers for information that would support, or cast doubt, on Creek’s account.

Faced with the killing of Gen Henry Wilson in London, London demanded immediate action against the Four Courts, held by anti-treaty forces since April. During a meeting before noon on June 28th, ministers were told that the British commander in Ireland, Gen Nevil Macready, did not then believe Collins would ask for troops.

“(Lord Cavan, chief of the imperial general staff) thought it was a great pity that the provisional government had not asked the imperial troops to carry out the task for them,” the minutes record.

By 7.45pm, British ministers were back in conclave. The news from Dublin was not good: four 18-pounder guns had been lent, but they were now short of ammunition. New supplies could be shipped, but they could be 24 hours away: “The danger of delay was that reinforcements might arrive from other parts of Ireland for Republican forces,” the minutes record.

Lord Cavan reported that a Royal Artillery officer “had, at the request of the provisional government been giving its forces advice on how to use 18-pounder guns. However, 18-pounders “were not of much value for this kind of fighting” and “heavier ordnance” was needed “against such solid buildings”.

Michael Collins, however, was “not willing to employ it, apparently because the use of such material would require the employment of the regular (ie British) troops”.

Believing that Collins and the provisional government could yet fall to anti-treaty forces, British ministers feared that the delay in seizing the Four Courts could force it to act. “If the British troops had to undertake the task in the end, it would now be much harder and a new plan would have to be formed,” the June 28th minutes record.

Then come the paragraphs that back Creek’s version of events. He says he and his unit were first shipped to Fermanagh and then told to march by night to Dublin.

“Information was received just before the meeting that the provisional government were willing to employ British gunners and to utilise 60-pounder guns,” according to the minutes. Indeed, the Irish were discussing accepting troops.

The provisional government “must be supported in every way, and the operation must not be allowed to fail”, British ministers agreed. Emergency stores of 18-pounder ammunition were to be sent.

A few hours later, British ministers convened again, sending a telegram to Collins: “By all means use the 300 18-pdr high-explosive shells as soon as they arrive, but this will be little use without heavier guns and good gunners. Do not fail to take both. Both are available. It is essential to take the 60-pdr, its gunners and it is ammunition and most desirable to use the six-inch howitzers as well and all together.”

Later that day, the Four Courts was briefly, but heavily, shelled and “the greater part of the building” captured by Collins’s forces, who were now titled Free State, not provisional government, forces.

However, Churchill was concerned about charges in Dublin already circulating that Collins had acted “at the behest” of the British , which had “reacted adversely on public opinion”.

Addressing fellow ministers, he said they should “dwell on the fact that they should avoid any suggestion that the Free State government was acting on British inspiration, and to lay stress on the fact that they have undertaken the task on their own initiatives”.

The cabinet minutes lack a definite declaration that Creek and his men were deployed, but Sheehan believes that, together with Creek’s account, they make a compelling case.”

We now have two eyewitness accounts, that of Frank Carney, a Pro-Treaty IRA and Irish National Army officer, and Percy Creek, a British artilleryman, along with contemporaneous British government papers, all strongly suggesting that the British participated directly in the Battle of the Four Courts in 1922. We also have the numerous claims and rumours reported in Dublin city and elsewhere from this period of British Forces acting on behalf of the Free State government.

The case for the prosecution would seem unanswerable.

Na Fianna – A Rough Edit

Something that might interest a few of you, a rough draft of a piece on the Fianna, the early Irish and Scottish version that is. I have lots to add in here, not least some of the information to be drawn from a couple of new fianna and Fionn-related academic titles I’ve read recently.

As I said, the result of a single dash of writing in the last hour, so don’t take it as gospel – just yet ;-)

"An tOglach The Official Organ of the Irish Volunteers" from October 21 1921

Reblogged from Irish Election Literature:

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Fascinating piece of history this , the October 21st 1921 issue of "An t-Ógláċ The Official Organ of the Irish Volunteers". There are articles about Revolvers, the importance of 'cover', Night Training and 'The Indian Situation'.
Many thanks to the sender.

An Sionnach Fionn: Great historical posting by Irish Election Literature of an October 21st 1921 issue of An tÓglach "The Volunteer", the official newspaper of Óglaigh na hÉireann (Irish Republican Army) during the Revolutionary period. Makes for fascinating reading. Wouldn't it be wonderful to see all these documents, the Irish Republican Bulletin, Irish War News, and other publications of the Revolution digitised and online? Now there is a task for someone in the lead-up to 2016.

Dirty Secrets Of A Dirty War

The Ballymurphy Massacre, Belfast 1971 – British War Crimes In Ireland

After several recent posts on An Sionnach Fionn detailing British war crimes in Ireland over the four decades of the northern conflict perhaps I should start a new series here? “Dirty Secrets of a Dirty War”?

Here is another one, from a former British Army medical officer who recounts how he opened fire on crowds during disturbances that surrounded the Ballymurphy Massacre of 1971 when British troops murdered eleven unarmed civilians and injured dozens of others in a small district of West Belfast during a three day reign of terror. One of the victims was a well-regarded local parish priest, Father Hugh Mullan, targeted by British snipers as he attended one of the wounded.

From the Belfast Telegraph:

“Nigel Mumford is proud of his time in the Parachute Regiment, but admits that some soldiers did break the law. Speaking to the Belfast Telegraph about his time serving in Northern Ireland, the ex-para paints a brutally honest picture of his time here.

It was a particularly vicious episode of the Troubles and Mr Mumford’s role as a medic saw him dealing with the aftermath of much violence in west Belfast.

In the first eyewitness account of Ballymurphy [ASF: the Ballmurphy Massacre] to be outlined by a para, Mr Mumford said: “I don’t like to speak against other paras, though some did break the law.”

…in the lethal atmosphere which followed the internment swoops and Ballymurphy massacre in August 1971. Then Mr Mumford was stationed in Henry Taggart base. Several people, including Joan Connolly, a 50-year-old woman searching for her children, were shot from the base.

The prelude to the shootings was a round-up of republican suspects in an internment swoop [ASF: detention and imprisonment without trial].

“Not everybody who was arrested was IRA but all were brutally beaten when they were brought into the Taggart Hall.

“Most of them were naked or in their underclothes,” Mr Mumford recalled.

“The lads behaved very brutally and in the morning a massive crowd started throwing stones at us.”

Mumford admits goading locals by shouting: “Up with the IRA — by the neck”.

His punishment of collecting stones lying in the base was cut short when IRA gunfire from nearby houses sprayed the fence beside him. Soldiers had earlier shot people in other parts of the estate.

“A group of about 30 or 40 guys ran for the front gate and the man on sentry duty asked for permission to shoot — he thought they were going to take him out. Then a patrol went out to protect him and they all opened fire and brought in nine people (wounded or dead) but there was a lot more shot than that” he said.

He admits aiming two shots from a Browning “in the direction of the firing” and claims: “I am quite sure I didn’t hit anyone.” In the aftermath he tended the casualties.

“As a medic I looked after about 12 people shot that night,” he added. “On that day there were no ballistics taken. It was like bloody war with no police on the scene, so trying to collect evidence now would be hopeless,” he said.

He claimed the HET [ASF: the PSNI's Historical Enquiries Team] “is trying to get an ex-soldier to change his statement and implicate the lads from First Para. They are trying to get someone to give evidence that the Army actually committed a crime”.

A HET spokesman appealed for Mr Mumford and other witnesses to come forward. He said the HET did not envisage interviewing Mr Mumford under caution but as a witness.

Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams was a senior republican in Ballymurphy but denies being an IRA member. He said yesterday: “None of the 11 dead in Ballymurphy had any connection to any armed group. They were all innocent civilians. Their deaths were part of a planned policy by the British government to pacify the community using the British Parachute Regiment.”

The Ballymurphy Massacre website contains a full account of the British Army atrocity:

9th August 1971

On the 9th of August 1971, at roughly 8:30pm, in the Springfield Park area of West Belfast, a local man was trying to lift children to safety when he was shot and wounded by the British Army’s Parachute Regiment. Local people tried to help the wounded man but were pinned back by the Parachute Regiment’s gunfire. Local parish priest, Father Hugh Mullan, telephoned the Henry Taggart army post to tell them he was going into the field to help the injured man.

Father Mullan entered the field, waving a white baby grow. He anointed the injured man, named locally as Bobby Clarke. Having identified that Bobby had received a flesh wound and was not fatally wounded Father Mullan attempted to leave the field. At this point Father Mullan was fatally shot in the back.

On witnessing such events another young man of 19 years, Frank Quinn, came out of his place of safety to help Father Mullan. Frank was shot in the back of the head as he tried to reach Father Mullan. The bodies of Father Hugh Mullan and Frank Quinn lay where they were shot until local people could safely reach them. Their bodies remained in neighbouring homes until they could be safely removed the next morning.

Tension was rising in the community as local youths fought back against the army’s horrendous campaign. Families were fleeing their homes in Springfield Park as they came under attack from [British] Loyalist mobs approaching from the direction of Springmartin. Parents frantically searched for their children. Local men were still being removed from their homes, beaten and interned [imprisoned without trial] without reason. All this and at the same time the people of Ballymurphy were trying to live a normal life.

Local people had started gathering at the bottom of Springfield Park, an area known locally as the Manse. Some of those gathering included Joseph Murphy who was returning from the wake of a local boy who drowned in a swimming accident. Joan Connolly and her neighbour Anna Breen stopped as they searched for their daughters. Daniel Teggart also stopped as he returned from his brother’s house which was close to Springfield Park. Daniel had gone to his brother’s house to check on his brother’s safety as his house had been attacked as local youth targeted the Henry Taggart Army base located nearby. Noel Phillips, a young man of 19 years, having just finished work walked to Springfield Park to check on the local situation.

Without warning the British Army opened fire from the direct of the Henry Taggart Army Base. The shooting was aimed directly at the gathering. In the panic people dispersed in all directions. Many people took refuge in a field directly opposite the army base. The British Army continued to fire and intensified their attack on this field.

Noel Phillips was shot in the back side. An injury that was later described in his autopsy as a flesh wound. As he lay crying for help, Joan Connolly, a mother of 8 went to his aid. Eye witnesses heard Joan call out to Noel saying “It’s alright son, I’m coming to you”.

In her attempt to aid Noel, Joan was shot in the face. When the gunfire stopped Noel Phillips, Joan Connolly, Joseph Murphy and many others lay wounded. Daniel Teggart, a father of 14, lay dead having been shot 14 times.

A short time later a British Army vehicle left the Henry Taggart Army Base and entered the field. A solider exited the vehicle, and to the dismay of the local eye witnesses, executed the already wounded Noel Phillips by shooting him once behind each ear with a hand gun.

Soldiers then began lifting the wounded and dead and throwing them into the back of the vehicle. Joseph Murphy, who had been shot once in the leg, was also lifted along with the other victims and taken to the Henry Taggart Army Base. Those lifted, including Joseph Murphy, were severely beaten. Soldiers brutally punched and kicked the victims. Soldiers jumped off bunks on top of victims and aggravated the victims’ existing wounds by forcing objects in to them. Mr Murphy was shot at close range with a rubber bullet into the wound he first received in the field. Mr Murphy died three weeks later from his injuries.

Joan Connolly, who had not been lifted by the soldiers when they first entered the field, lay wounded where she had been shot. Eye witnesses claimed Joan cried out for help for many hours. Joan was eventually removed from the field around 2:30am on 10th August. Autopsy reports state that Joan, having been repeatedly shot, bled to death.

10th August 1971

Eddie Doherty, a father of two from the St James’ area of West Belfast, had visited his elderly parents in the Turf Lodge area, on the evening of Tuesday 10th August to check on their safety during the ongoing unrest. He was making his way home along the Whiterock road, as he approached the West Rock area he noticed a barricade which had been erected by local people in an attempt to restrict access to the British Army.

A local man named Billy Whelan, known to Eddie, stopped him and the pair passed commented on the ongoing trouble. At the same time a British Army digger [armoured digger] and Saracen [armoured personnel carrier] moved in to dismantle the barricade. From the digger, a soldier from the Parachute Regiment opened fire. Eddie was fatally shot in the back. Local people carried him to neighbouring homes in an attempt to provide medical attention but Eddie died a short time later from a single gunshot wound.

11th August 1971

At roughly 4am on 11th August John Laverty, a local man of 20 years, was shot and killed by soldiers from the British Army’s Parachute Regiment. Joseph Corr, a local father of 6, was also shot and wounded by the same regiment. Mr Corr died of his injuries 16 days later. The Parachute Regiment’s account stated that both men were firing at the army and were killed as the army responded. Neither men were armed and ballistic and forensic evidence tested at the time disproved the Army’s testimony.

Pat McCarthy, a local community worker who came to work in Ballymurphy from England, was shot in the hand on the same day as he was attempting to leave the local community centre to distribute milk and bread to neighbouring families. A few hours later and nursing his wounded hand, Pat decided to continue with the deliveries. He was stopped by soldiers from the British Army’s Parachute Regiment who harassed and beat him.

Eye witnesses’ watched in horror as the soldiers carried out a mock execution on Pat by placing a gun in his mouth and pulling the trigger, only for the gun to be unloaded. Pat suffered a massive heart attack and the same soldiers stopped local people from trying to help Pat. As a result Pat died from the ordeal.

John McKerr, a father of 8 and a carpenter from the Andersonstown Road area, was carrying out repair work in Corpus Christi Chapel on the 11th August. John took a short break to allow the funeral of a local boy, who drowned in a swimming accident, to take place. As he waited outside the chapel for the funeral mass to end, John was shot once in the head by a British soldier from the Army’s Parachute Regiment.

Despite the harassment of the British Army, local people went to his aid and remained at his side until an ambulance arrived. One local woman, named locally as Maureen Heath, argued with the soldiers as they refused to allow John to be taken in the ambulance. John was eventually taken to hospital but died of his injuries 9 days later having never regained consciousness.”

Britain At War – Terror In Ireland

British Troops Pose With British Terrorist Symbols, British Occupied North Of Ireland

Veteran Irish journalist and writer Ed Moloney in CounterPunch on President Obama’s continued adherence to the strategy and tactics of the United States’ so-called War on Terror, notably torture and extra-judicial killings, and some Irish related matters:

“March 2011 was a busy month at the Department of Justice’s International Affairs Office (IAO) in Washington D.C. The British Home Office had just started the process of serving subpoenas on Boston College’s Belfast Project archive and its officials had begun liaising with the IAO’s staff. The subpoenas were seemingly routine matters covered by the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the US and the UK and it is unlikely that at this point they were causing the office’s director, Mary Ellen Warlow any grounds for anxiety or concern.

The British had requested the subpoenas be kept sealed, i.e. secret, the US had agreed and if Boston College co-operated and agreed not to resist them then the requested material – interviews with the late Belfast IRA leader Brendan Hughes and former leading IRA activist Dolours Price – could be on the desks of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) within weeks, before anyone knew the subpoenas even existed.

The UK was one of the few enthusiastic allies of the US in its never-ending war against militant Islam and as a sign of his readiness to work with the Americans, British prime minister Tony Blair had agreed changes in the extradition treaty with America that enormously eased the process of transferring suspects from Britain to the US. The changes, which meant UK citizens could be extradited on the minimum of evidence, had outraged liberal opinion in Britain so the request from the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) offered a chance for an American quid pro quo, an opportunity to demonstrate gratitude for Blair and Britain’s generous co-operation.

Not only that but the alleged offense at the heart of the British request was regarded in some circles as a dreadful war crime. Jean McConville, a widowed mother-of-ten had been abducted, taken across the Irish border and killed by the Irish Republican Army in 1972, at the outset of its lengthy war to eject Britain from Northern Ireland, her body buried in an unknown grave and her death kept a closely guarded secret, even from her family. She had been caught spying for the British Army in a public housing project in Belfast regarded as an IRA redoubt. Let off once with a warning, her British handlers had encouraged her to resume her surveillance of IRA activists and when she was again caught, this time there was no mercy.

The ‘disappearing’ of some of its victims during the Troubles was a dark stain on the IRA’s reputation and the source of considerable internal dissension. McConville had been ‘disappeared’ so as to avoid the bad publicity that would be attached to her death but some senior IRA figures objected, saying that doing this in secret negated the only valid reason for killing her, which was to deter others from becoming informers. ‘Disappearing’ people also evoked unwelcome and unsavoury comparisons with the likes of Pinochet or the Argentinean junta. This chapter in the IRA’s history has, unsurprisingly, haunted its then leaders ever since.

So, when Mary Ellen Warlow reviewed the subpoena request it would have been surprising had she not concluded that no-one would take up cudgels for the IRA over the killing of Jean McConville. It would be an open and shut case: bringing a terrorist group involved in a heinous crime to justice.

It was very possibly because of these considerations that Mary Ellen Warlow appears not to have conducted the due diligence such requests normally warrant. Had she done so, she would have discovered that the PSNI had ample opportunity to collect the evidence they allegedly needed in Belfast and had no reason to seek it on the campus of Boston College. Fifteen months before the subpoenas were served on Boston College, Dolours Price had given a taped interview to a Belfast newspaper allegedly admitting her role in the ‘disappearing’ of McConville but the PSNI had let it pass. The law on such matters says that subpoena-like actions are justified only if no other routes to evidence exist. Clearly that was not the case here.

Had Ms Warlow dug a little deeper, or perhaps been a little less trusting in her dealings with PSNI detectives, she would also have discovered that Dolours Price – who lives in Dublin, outside the jurisdiction of the PSNI – had actually been in the custody of a court in Northern Ireland in May 2010, three months after reports of her alleged role in the McConville disappearance had appeared in the Belfast press and could easily have been arrested by the PSNI and questioned about her role in the McConville affair. But the PSNI had let this opportunity pass by. Again the PSNI had failed to follow up a local lead, again undermining the basis for the Boston College subpoenas.

A little more effort and Ms Warlow would also have discovered that the PSNI had made no effort at all to establish the truth of a key justification for the subpoenas – a claim by a reporter for a Belfast tabloid that he had listened to Price’s interview with Boston College and that in it she had admitted to abducting McConville. In fact this was just not possible. Only one copy of each IRA interview was made and they are kept in a secure vault at Boston College, with access limited to only one person, the university’s librarian. The idea that the college would release such a sensitive and confidential record to a junior reporter at a tawdry tabloid newspaper 3,000 miles away was patently nonsense but nonetheless the claim figured prominently in the DoJ grounds for serving the subpoenas.

And she would also have discovered that the same police force seeking to bring former IRA members before the courts in Belfast is, along with its political masters in London, determinedly refusing to pursue policemen, soldiers and intelligence officials who committed, authorised, connived at and turned a blind eye to multiple murders in Ireland.

One of the most notorious of these was the killing of Pat Finucane, the Belfast attorney shot dead by Loyalist gunmen in 1989. It is now known that British military intelligence provided a photo to the Loyalist agent who set up the killing and briefed him on the lawyer’s movements to make the killer squad’s job easier. In the midst of the controversy over the Boston College subpoenas, British prime minister David Cameron announced that he was withdrawing a promise made by his predecessor, Tony Blair to hold a full public inquiry into the Finucane killing, a probe that would likely have uncovered the role played by Britain’s internal intelligence agency, MI5. Finucane’s killing is one of dozens of police, intelligence and army-linked deaths that the PSNI will not probe.

And finally, if she and her staffers had dug a little deeper, Ms Warlow would have discovered that the PSNI had another possible motive in seeking the subpoenas that helped to explain why, after some forty years failing to investigate the McConville ‘disappearance’, police detectives in Belfast had suddenly become energized.

The man who was widely suspected of ordering McConville’s disappearance was none other than Gerry Adams, the IRA’s leading force during the Troubles and the chief architect of the peace process which, inter alia, had led to the effective disbandment of the PSNI’s predecessor, the overwhelmingly Unionist and Protestant-dominated Royal Ulster Constabulary.

There was reason to believe, in the form of public statements by former senior RUC detectives, that revenge against Adams for destroying the police force they loved and cherished – and which they saw as their bulwark against Irish unity – was a major factor in the legal move…”

The alphabet soup of British-state militias in Ireland in the 1970s, '80s and '90s - the UDR (now the RIR) and the RUC (now the PSNI)

The alphabet soup of British-state militias in Ireland in the 1970s, ’80s and ’90s – the UDR (now the RIR) and the RUC (now the PSNI)

In a related note, the Guardian newspaper carries the latest revelations from Britain’s historic Dirty War in Ireland, including more evidence of the close relationship between the British state and British terrorist organisations operating in the North of Ireland, in this case the Ulster Defence Association (UDA):

“A secret memo that urged the army to shed its inhibitions in the “war” against the IRA and be “suitably indemnified” could prompt a fresh wave of legal action, lawyers in Northern Ireland have said.

The expression of enthusiasm for military action with apparent disregard for any legal consequences, at the height of the Troubles in July 1972, has surprised human rights groups, who are still pursuing justice for victims.

Released through the public records office in Belfast, the minutes record a meeting at Stormont Castle chaired by Willie Whitelaw, then Northern Ireland secretary. Also in attendance were the GOC (the most senior army officer in the province), Paul Channon MP, the deputy chief constable and senior civil servants.

The document, marked “secret”, has only recently come to the attention of campaign groups and lawyers who, in the wake of the inquiry into the Bloody Sunday massacre in Derry, have focused on re-examining killings by the security forces.

It notes… “…the government’s intention to carry on the war with the IRA with the utmost vigour”.

It added: “The GOC would see UDA [the loyalist paramilitary Ulster Defence Association] leaders and impress upon them that while their efforts as vigilantes in their own areas were acceptable, their presence in any riot or shooting situation could not be tolerated.”

In terms of military response, it ordered that: “The army should not be inhibited in its campaign by the threat of court proceedings and should therefore be suitably indemnified.”

Mark Thompson, director of Relatives for Justice, which campaigns on behalf of victims, said: “The discovery of this document indemnifying British soldiers from the threat of court proceedings whilst they took their ‘war’ to nationalist communities with the ‘utmost vigour’ is the first official documented evidence of a policy amounting to impunity.

“Despite their involvement in sectarian murders, the UDA was not [at that time] a proscribed organisation. They were permitted to patrol areas and exist alongside the RUC and British army at a time when intelligence would have clearly shown the UDA to be involved in sectarian murders.”

That Sunday in July 1972, in fact, five people had been shot dead by republican paramilitaries, and six Catholics, including a priest, were killed by the British army.

Paul O’Connor, of the Pat Finucane Centre in Derry, which also examines files from the period, said: “This document tells us something about the culture [at the time]. We deal with cases of people who were being kidnapped at UDA checkpoints and who were tortured and murdered. That ties in with allowing UDA members to join the Ulster Defence Regiment. It was the worst months of the Troubles.””

Joint footpatrol of British UDA terrorists and British Army soldiers, British Occupied North of Ireland, 1970s

The revelation that the head of the British Army in the North of Ireland, the General Officer Commanding or GOC, was holding face-to-face meetings with British terrorist leaders to elicit their co-operation in the counter-insurgency campaign against the Irish Republican Army is shocking in its apparent casual nature. Here is one of the most senior officers in the British Armed Forces, the director of military operations in Ireland, sitting down with the murderers of Irish civilians, of men, women and children, to discuss their operations – albeit with the intent of focusing them. It is the equivalent of the meetings held during the Bosnian War of the 1990s between the generals of the Yugoslavian Federal Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the leaders of the Serbian militias – as the campaign of ethnic-cleansing was taking place throughout the towns and villages of the former Yugoslavian state.

More proof, if proof needed, of Britain’s state-sponsored terrorism in Ireland and its terrible repercussions.

British soldiers in Afghanistan display their racist and sectarian Orange Order emblems and British Unionist flags

British soldiers in Afghanistan display their racist and sectarian Orange Order emblems and British Unionist flags

Former British Agent Admits Irish Citizens Were Waterboarded

Irish Civilian Tortured In The British Occupied North Of Ireland, Image Early 1970s

I’ve written before on An Sionnach Fionn about the widespread use of torture, both physical and psychological, by the British Forces in the North of Ireland, particularly during the 1970s and ‘80s. Thousands of men, women and children suffered various forms of abuse at the hands of British Army and British paramilitary police interrogators in military and police bases across the north-eastern part of Ireland during the first two decades of the conflict. From beatings in the cells to bound and hooded men being thrown out of hovering helicopters a few meters above the ground the records show countless accounts of brutality. Later these practices of torture were modified through the use of “special techniques” – psychological torture to you and me. The first victims were known as the “Guinea Pigs” and the effects of their treatment remains with them to the present day.

Incredibly, just as with the use of torture by the United States in its so-called War on Terror, all these actions were given official, legal sanction by both the British government and the British judiciary. What other nation in the western democratic world would permit the legalised torture of people it claimed were its citizens? What other nation would permit the creation of torture centres for the incarceration and “processing” of people it claimed were its citizens? Well, up to the 2000s that is.

Interestingly, despite numerous specific cases being catalogued and reported on by several international investigations (including by the United Nations Committee Against Torture, Amnesty International and the US Congress), the British state continues to deny that any campaign of systematic abuse occurred in the first two decades of Britain’s Dirty War in Ireland. Even a condemnatory ruling by the International Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg brought little recognition from British authorities. Yet, every now and again, things slip out that reveal just how widespread and matter-of-fact the practices of torture were.

Irish Prisoner Eddie Carmichael, Beaten By British Troops

The latest is a tiny, if informative, admission by Harry Ferguson, a former agent with the British Intelligence Service or SIS (colloquially MI6), now turned writer and historian. Here he is in the Huffington Post UK discussing the use of torture by the United States and its proxies, when out trips this admission:

“As to the morality, British reasoning is simple: we don’t use torture because it doesn’t work. Like the CIA we had to learn the hard way. In Northern Ireland, IRA terrorist suspects were waterboarded in the 1970s. Even using such techniques, it took time to overcome the subject’s resistance and by then the intelligence gained was virtually worthless. Intelligence is nothing if it is not timely.

Instead modern spies are taught that interrogation is a game of time – and it is something that those IRA suspects who were water boarded understood just as well. From the moment an agent is picked up and his loss is reported, the service is working to establish who and what might be compromised. Other agents will be moved, codes will be changed and, if necessary, entire operations will be closed down. You are not trying to hold out forever. You are holding out for as long as you can. You know that every minute before you break can be counted as another life saved.”

Of course what Ferguson fails to point out is that the majority of the Irish “suspects” formally tortured by the British Forces in Ireland between 1970 and 1979 were entirely innocent people. In fact, an estimated 80% of the men, women and children in that period who were “interrogated in depth” (the official British euphemism) were later evaluated as having had little to no information to impart. Which makes those interrogations less about seeking out counter-insurgency intelligence from enemy combatants than punishing and intimidating the civilian community which hosted them. One by one.

The Stress Position In Use, British Occupied Ireland, 1970s

Finally, you may wonder why I use the words “formally tortured” in the paragraph above? That is because the British Forces inflicted thousands of informal tortures throughout the British Occupied North of Ireland, and throughout the lifespan of the conflict. Take this recent account from the Irish singer and celebratory Brian Kennedy of his childhood in Belfast under the British regime, and the casualness of abuse by the British troops – even against schoolchildren:

“Brian recalls how he himself felt the ire of British soldiers.

‘One asked me something and out of pure contrariness I started answering him in Irish. He put his gun right to my balls and he goes, ‘Paddy, you better start speaking in English’.’

Did he have a hatred for the British back then?

‘I hated how scary it was. They could stop you at any time and ask you were you were going, when you were coming back — and clearly I was going to school. They got into an awful habit of making you take your shoes off and socks off to search you in the freezing cold in the morning. Then they would say all these awful things about your mother, about your sister — and that was just so you could get beyond them to get to school.’”

He later forgave his abusers and moved on, finding indeed in Britain itself a career and liberation of sorts. Well away from the coal face of the Irish war zone, though.

So, that was then, and this is now. But what has changed? Have the British officially admitted the use of physical and psychological torture against thousands of Irish citizens who found themselves trapped under continued British jurisdiction in the North of Ireland? Has the Irish government, their government, sought redress and compensation for their grievances? And what of the torturers?

Held In The Stress Position By British Soldiers, Irish Politician John Hume, Future Winner Of The Nobel Peace Prize

Not one British subject has served one day or even one minute in prison for the campaign of terror unleashed in the military and paramilitary installations in the north-east of Ireland. Indeed many have instead found themselves promoted or rewarded within the British Armed Forces, paramilitary police (the then RUC and its PSNI successor) and Intelligence community (MI5, MI6 and all the other abbreviations).

And, to borrow a phrase from elsewhere, they haven’t gone away you know.

History And Counter-History In Ireland – Confronting The Apologist Historians

Two Irish civilians forced to parade around a Waterford town by British troops with a British flag tied around their necks. Both men were beaten and dumped outside the town. The War of Independence, Ireland, 1920

Irish civilians forced to parade around a Waterford town by British troops with a British flag tied around their necks. Both were beaten and their bodies dumped outside the town. The War of Independence, Ireland, 1920

Just a quick post to highlight Protestant Cork 1911-1926, one of the best resources I’ve seen so far on the issue of the alleged decline in the numbers of Protestants living in the region of Cork City and County in the closing years and aftermath of the Irish Revolution. The reason this issue is so important is because of the claims made in relation to it by apologist historians and journalists on behalf of British rule in Ireland (the misnamed “revisionists”). This site is no simple Irish Nationalist or Republican one but follows a neutral line between both sides in order to maintain objectivity and scholarly standing. Meticulously researched, analytical, and with a host of primary sources both old and new, it is essential reading for anyone interested in this artificially contentious subject.

“It has been claimed that the Irish War of Independence from Britain in Cork turned into an ethnic pogrom driven by fear of mostly Protestant outsiders.

This site shows that the story is far more complex and nuanced that this simplistic view.

The Population declined by 14470 in 15 years, but 10,714 non-Irish-born Protestants lived in Cork in 1911.

Most were military, or government. Has this story been told properly?”

The conclusion is fair and balanced – even to a Republican:

“This article aims to correct our understanding of the issue through using new resources online to improve older research. As much written about this topic has either been incompletely researched, unverifiable, or supposition dressed up as fact, it is difficult to winnow out the fact from the fiction. It has often been necessary to return to the original source to examine its accuracy. To their credit those who have followed standard academic referencing to a verifiable source allowed this process to happen; the unverifiable sources should not be treated as being anything other than hearsay.

The War of Independence was driven by nationalism, and as 1921 continued it descended into the mire of a bloody war of reprisals. While this may revolt some people, and others may question the need for it, the people involved at the time had no idea if they were going to win or lose. If they had known the outcome they may have stayed their hand. Equally, if they had not pursued the savage course they took would the British have offered a truce? Was the impetus for truce the fact that the Ulster Unionists had secured partition? These are the questions that need answering.

The Dunmanway killings are different in that they occurred after independence. The Irish State failed to protect its citizens. No evidence has been produced to suggest that the IRA garrison attempted to leave the barracks and take control of the town, and at the very least this was a dereliction of duty. All we do know for certain is that 16 Protestants, and one Catholic, were shot or disappeared in West Cork over a three day period. Others of both main faiths were shot at or targeted for shooting. We know who shot four of them in Macroom, and we can suspect who may have shot the others. However, there was insufficient evidence to charge anyone with the killings. The murders were denounced by both sides of Sinn Féin, and vulnerable citizens were protected by the local Anti-Treaty IRA. Civilians and military were warned they would be shot if they didn’t hand in all guns to the local IRA commanders throughout the area. The killings resulted in the emigration of a small number of native Church of Ireland and other Protestant members from the county, but the contemporary Protestant sources stubbornly refuse to suggest a sectarian pogrom: Bolshevik certainly, agrarian definitely, nationalist undoubtedly but sectarian exceptionally.

There is no justification for the actual Dunmanway killings. Even if each and every one of the men shot were informers they had been granted amnesty by the Truce. If they had breached the Truce then they should have been brought before a court of law and tried. Whatever the reason for their killings, if the IRA were involved then it was a betrayal of their oath to the Republic. However to use this event to argue that there was a sustained campaign against Protestants because of their religion is not supported by any of the evidence from the time: Protestant, Catholic or Dissenter.

It is important neither to understate nor overstate what happened in the revolutionary period. This was a savage period in Irish history. A vicious war, using methods which eschewed the norms of war up to that point, was fought to a draw in July 1921. This was followed by an even more savage Civil War which led to a complete breakdown of law. Those with property, and known Treaty supporters were most at risk, and ex-Unionists fell into both these categories. The new Irish state did its best to protect all of its citizens, and yet there were appalling atrocities committed. The evidence does not support the theory that Protestants were targeted because of their religion. Historians are entitled to speculate, but in this case has the speculation run away with the story? Is it time to stop this pointless debate, and write true history?”

A column of Irish refugees fleeing the ruins of their homes following the Sack of Balbriggan by the British Occupation Forces during the Irish War of Independence, Ireland, 1920

Irish refugees hiding in the countryside following the Sack of Balbriggan, the destruction by the British Occupation Forces of the small village of Balbriggan during the War of Independence, Ireland, 1920

Some more analysis below.

Niall Meehan:

Irish Political Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, February 2012,  ‘The Further One Gets From Belfast’, a second reply to Jeff Dudgeon

Irish Political Review, Vol. 26 No 11, November 2011,  Reply to Jeffrey Dudgeon on Peter Hart

History Ireland, November-December 2011, Vol. 19 No 6 History Ireland letter on second edition of Gerard Murphy’s The Year of Disappearances

Spinwatch 24 May 2011, Distorting Irish History Two, the road from Dunmanway: Peter Hart’s treatment of the 1922 ‘April killings’ in West Cork

FINAL 16 NOV 2010 1 An ‘amazing coincidence’ that ‘could mean anything’: Gerard Murphy’s The Year of Disappearances

Spinwatch November 2010, Distorting Irish History, the stubborn facts of Kilmichael: Peter Hart and Irish Historiography

Irish Times Monday, October 12, 2009, Sectarian gloss on State’s early years is flawed

Dublin Review of Books, Issue Number 11 – Autumn 2009, Frank Gallagher and land agitation – A response to Tom Wall’s ‘Getting Them Out, Southern Loyalists in the War of Independence’ (drb, Issue 9 Spring 2009)

History Ireland, Vol 17 No 4 July August 2009, A response on use (and non-use) of sources to Professor David Fitzpatrick (TCD)

Irish Political Review, Vol 23, No3, March 2008, After the War of Independence, some further questions about West Cork, April 27-29 1922

Counterpunch, November 11/12, 2006, “The Wind That Shakes the Barley” Sends Revisionists Yapping at History’s Heels

Pádraig Óg Ó Ruairc:

Troops of the British Occupation Forces watch over Dublin City from rooftop machinegun-posts during the War of Independence, Ireland, 1921

David Fitzpatrick:

Dublin Review of Books (DRB): History In A Hurry

Troops of the British Occupation Forces watch over Dublin City during the War of Independence, Ireland, 1920

John Borgonovo:

History Ireland, Book Review: Gerard Murphy, the Year of Disappearances

The British Forces confront civilian protestors during a raid on the Regal Hotel in Dublin City, the Irish War of Independence, Ireland, 1920

Eugenio Biagini:

Reviews in History: Gerard Murphy, the Year of Disappearances

British Army vehicle checkpoint in Dublin City, the Irish War of Independence, Ireland, 1920

Three very short book reviews of my own:

John Borgonovo’s Spies, Informers and the ‘Anti-Sinn Fein Society’: The Intelligence War in Cork City, 1919-1921

Peter Hart’s The I.R.A. and its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-1923

Gerard Murphy’s The Year of Disappearances: Political Killings in Cork, 1920-1921

Bobaí Ó Seachnasaigh

The British version of the Huffington Post, which strangely I’ve always found a wee bit right-wing given its liberal US origins, carries a lengthy article on Roibeárd “Bobaí” Ó Seachnasaigh or Bobby Sands, Volunteer of the Irish Republican Army and elected representative of the people of Fermanagh and South Tyrone in the British Occupied North of Ireland. What’s more extraordinary is its tone:

“”I am standing on the threshold of another trembling world. May God have mercy on my soul.”

With these words, written 31 years ago, Bobby Sands began the hunger strike which culminated in his death after 66 days on May 5 1981.

It was followed by the deaths of nine others who made the same sacrifice: Francis Hughes, Patsy O’Hara, Raymond McCreesh, Joe McDonnell, Martun Hurson, Kevin Lynch, Kieran Doherty, Thomas McElwee and Michael Devine.

Just over three decades on it is perhaps difficult to appreciate the significance of the sacrifice made by Sands and his comrades, which even if you disagree with the aims for which they gave their lives remains a monumental testament to the power of the human spirit.

By the time of his death in 1981 the ‘troubles’ in the Six Counties in the North of Ireland had been raging since the late 1960s, when the Provisional IRA emerged from the failure of successive British governments to reform the sectarian and gerrymandered province, in which the minority Catholic/Nationalist population were regarded as second class citizens, denied the same political and civil rights as their protestant/unionist counterparts.

Young, otherwise ordinary working class Catholics such as Bobby Sands were forced to make a choice between acceptance of a status quo under which they and their families were persecuted, intimidated, and forced out of their homes by loyalist mobs backed up by a bigoted police force, or resistance.

Sands chose the path of resistance and was arrested and imprisoned twice as a result. Upon his second arrest in 1976 he was interrogated, tortured, and sentenced to 14 years in prison in a trial presided over by three judges with no jury. During his first period of incarceration – 1972 to 1976 – Sands had used his time well, immersing himself in books and study groups with his comrades to learn about the history of the Irish liberation struggle, national liberation and anti-colonial struggles throughout the developing world, literature, and the Irish language.

The removal of the political status of the prisoners had begun in 1976 under the then Labour government led by James Callaghan. This was timed to tie in with the construction of the new purpose built Maze Prison just outside Belfast, where both Republican and Loyalist prisoners were to be transferred from the existing Long Kesh Prison Camp nearby and other detention facilities across the province. Margaret Thatcher and the Tories, replacing Callaghan’s Labour government in 1979, were determined to continue the policy of criminalization of Republican prisoners as part of a new offensive against Irish Republicanism in general.

As determined as Sands and his comrades were to see their hunger strike through to the end, Thatcher was equally determined not to budge one inch from the policy of criminalisation. This continued even after Sands was elected as a British Member of Parliament in the midst of his hunger strike in a local by-election, and even in the face of growing international condemnation over the British government’s unwillingness to compromise.

The prisoners had five demands:

1. The right not to wear a prison uniform;
2. The right not to do prison work;
3. The right of free association with other prisoners, and to organise educational and recreational pursuits;
4. The right to one visit, one letter and one parcel per week;
5. Full restoration of remission lost through the protest

The enormity of what Bobby Sands and his comrades who died along with him on hunger strike achieved was reflected in its global impact. Upon Sands’s death, opposition MPs in the Indian Parliament observed a minute’s silence. Protest marches were held against the British government and in tribute to Sands and his comrades.

Following their example, Nelson Mandela led a hunger by prisoners on Robben Island to improve their own conditions. In Tehran the name of the street in which the British Embassy was located was changed to Bobby Sands Street, forcing it to relocate its entrance to avoid the embarrassment of Bobby Sands Street appearing on the letterhead of its stationery and official documents.”

Given the left-wing credentials of the author of the piece, journalist John Wright, perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised but the British media have spent so much of the last 50 years fighting the good fight on behalf of the Pax Britannica in Ireland that its still shocking to see an article telling the truth. And not simply more of the same old lies and propaganda.

More Cloak And Dagger Shenanigans In Fantasy Troubles

And so it rumbles on, the latest chapter in the tale of Britain’s super-superspy and double-agent extraordinaire Freddie “Stakeknife” Scappaticci, with the audio recordings of calls between Ian Hurst (the nom de guerre of Martin Ingram, an alleged former British military Intelligence agent) and Sir John Wilsey (former General Officer Commanding the British Army in the Occupied North of Ireland during the early 1990s). Not much new, not much we didn’t know already, and all rather desperate really. But judge for yourself here.

The Myths Of Easter 1916 – And The Truth

The Irish “Twin Towers” – The GPO, Dublin, Destroyed By British Occupation Forces, 1916

Introduction

The annual commemoration of Éirí Amach na Cásca or the Easter Rising of 1916 and the commencement of the Irish Revolution is upon us yet again. Some ninety-six years ago on Easter Monday, 1916, members of several Irish Republican organisations came together to unite in a general insurrection against British rule across the island of Ireland. Orchestrated by the secret revolutionary movement of the Bráithreachas Phoblacht na hÉireann (BPnahÉ) or in English the Irish Republican Brotherhood or IRB (popularly known as Na Fíníní or the Fenians), the organisations which took to the streets of the capital city and a number of other towns and districts around the country were to shape Irish history for decades to come. They included:

Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓnahÉ) “Irish Volunteers (IV)”

Arm Cathartha na hÉireann (ACnahÉ) ”Irish Citizen Army (ICA)”

Cumann na mBan (CnamB)

Na Fianna Éireann (NFÉ)

The Hibernian Rifles (HR)

Together they now comprised the new Arm Poblachtach na hÉireann (APnahÉ) or in the English language the Army of the Irish Republic or Irish Republican Army (IRA) whose purpose was to defend the Irish Republic and the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic proclaimed on the steps of General Post Office or GPO in Dublin. Unfortunately confusion about the timing and nature of the uprising meant a national insurrection failed to materialise and instead a number of isolated risings took place around the island of Ireland (largely in Dublin city and county, but with smaller actions in Waterford, Wexford, Meath, Louth, Tyrone, Fermanagh and Galway). After several days of fighting during which much of the city-centre of Dublin was destroyed by British ground and naval artillery, the Forces of the Irish Republic in the capital surrendered to the far larger British Occupation Forces which had now flooded the country with reinforcements. Within days fighting around the rest of the island came to a halt as well (though in fact skirmishes both in Dublin and elsewhere continued for some time, principally through sniping and isolated attacks).

Part Of Dublin City, Destroyed By The British Occupation Forces, 1916

How People Viewed The Rising

The reaction of the general public in Dublin, the centre of British rule in Ireland for 800 years and the most thoroughly colonised region of the island outside of the north-east, was mixed. Within the large local British or British Unionist population (Protestants and Roman Catholics who viewed themselves as Irish and British or exclusively British), the majority feeling was of hostility to the “Rebels” and support for the British state in Ireland. Since this community was closely invested in the continuance of British rule to protect its privileged political, social, economic and cultural standing in the country it was the one that was the most vocal it its expressions of loyalty to Britain and calls for “retribution” against the “Rebels”, their supporters, families and communities. Indeed when captured or surrendered Irish Republican revolutionaries paraded by the British Forces through British Unionist areas of the city came under verbal and physical assault from crowds of mainly working-class and some middle-class British loyalists publicly mixing together in ways that probably hadn’t been seen since the last visit of a British head of state to the island. Earlier during the actual fighting stage of the Rising crowds of British Unionists had also lined the streets to cheer passing British troops in the more middle-class southern suburbs of the city, after the soldiers had disembarked from transport-ships arriving from Britain.

On the other hand the reaction of the Irish or Irish Nationalist community in Dublin, the majority one in the region, was much more complex. Living under absolute and virtually unbroken British rule for centuries had inculcated in it the idea of the absolute might and mastery of the British Empire: not just in Ireland but across the globe (a belief encouraged by the British state itself through every aspect of intellectual life, from education to literature). The suggestion that Irish people could successfully rise up against the British in Ireland seemed like madness and simple wish fulfilment to most ordinary Dubliners. Most men and women simply couldn’t imagine such a thing happening (however much they may have desired it). Living in the “police state” created by British colonial rule, where the conspicuous presence of the paramilitary police force of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) and dozens of British military garrisons around the island was a daily reminder of the might of Britain, very few could imagine anything else. Just as importantly generations of Irish people had been made to believe, through centuries of British propaganda, that the Irish as a race were “unfit” to govern themselves: too uneducated, unintelligent, uncivilized.

British Occupation Forces, Dublin, 1916

Fearing the reaction of the British to the “Rebellion” (and with good reason given the traditional savagery of British responses in the past) many in the Irish Nationalist community adopted a wait-and-see approach to the would-be revolution. If it failed, as most fully expected to happen, they did not want to be seen to be on the wrong side – by the British. The Irish people knew through long and bitter experience that those perceived by the British authorities as being “traitors” or “treasonous” in their attitudes would have found themselves at the very least forced into unemployment, perhaps homelessness and impoverishment too (and this in a city where institutional discrimination against the Irish Nationalist community remained commonplace and malnutrition, starvation and disease was rampant in the Nationalist inner-city ghettos). Worse they could have been arrested or interned without trial, and possibly “deported” or exiled from the country by British diktat. And, the greatest fear of all, they could have simply been rounded up and executed by the British Forces in a series of mass retributions or communal punishments from which there would be no escape.

Yet the history of the Easter Rising is replete with accounts of civilian men, women and children risking their lives to help the revolutionaries throughout the capital city and county. What’s more remarkable is the breadth of people who lent aid and succour to the insurrectionists, a breadth that seemed to cut across class divisions and boundaries. From washerwomen to businessmen, dockers to doctors, barmen to teachers, hundreds of people, both during the fighting and after the surrender did what they could when they could to aid the cause of the Irish Republic. And this at a time when the first British retributions had already taken place: when buildings in the city-centre and neighbouring working-class districts were being pounded by British artillery and machine-gun fire, killing involved and uninvolved alike; when civilians had been murdered in different parts of the city by attacking British Forces, some of them tortured before hand; when some captured “rebels” or suspected ”rebels” were simply being executed on the spot by British officers and soldiers infuriated by the temerity of the Irish to rise up against nearly a thousand years of ”ordained” and “lawful” British rule in Ireland.

O’Connell St, Dublin After The Easter Rising 1916, From O’Connell Bridge

In contrast to the affluent and often “ethnically British” southern suburbs of Dublin in the mainly Irish Nationalist areas of the inner city and northern reaches the long lines of captured “rebels” were applauded and cheered by crowds who refused to be cowed by the threatening British troops and watchful RIC policemen. Here and there groups of women and girls would suddenly rush forward pushing little parcels of food and clothes into the hands of the bewildered prisoners, and just as suddenly withdraw as the British bayonets would dash towards them. And sometimes a wounded man or a teenage boy would be dragged or carried away with them to disappear into the warren of back streets and alleyways to the fury of the British escorts. Across the city dozens of revolutionaries relied on the sanctuary offered by local people who hid them in cellars and attics, sheds and outhouse, as the British and their willing RIC servants went from house to house, street to street furiously seeking them out. Even as the British reinforcements had entered the city proper during the latter days of the Rising in many areas they had met a sullen, uncooperative population (something already experienced by some locally raised soldiers in the so-called “Irish Regiments”) and a marked hostility in some districts that puzzled or angered them. Later the feelings of much of the city’s inhabitants grew far worse: resentful of the Rising’s failure (even if the vast majority never though it would succeed in the first place), strangely and paradoxically proud that it had taken place at all, angry at the destruction of so much of the city’s heart by the British Occupation Forces, and already aware of the quickly circulated accounts of massacres and outrages carried out by its troops.

Outside of Dublin, in those rural areas where the British writ did not run so firmly, the civilian population was much more vocal in its support. In Galway and Wexford and other places the scattered revolutionaries were greeted as an army of liberation in some villages and parishes, while the handful of local RIC officers who enforced British rule with such iron determination barricaded themselves into their fortified police barracks or fled to the next biggest British military garrison. Only when the news of the surrender by the Provisional Government in Dublin reached them did local people in country districts retreat into their customary guise of silence and withdrawal, so as not to be singled out for retribution by the British state and its many, many servants in Ireland. Yet, even here, more “rebels” found a willing and helpful hand than not, and many young men simply discarded their weapons and equipment and returned home to their families and communities in the more isolated rural areas who closed ranks around them.

Dublin, 1916

The Myths of 1916

The great myth of the Easter Rising is the claim that the decision by the British military and government to execute the members of the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic and other principal figures who had participated in the insurrection, led to the turning of public opinion in Ireland in favour of the revolutionaries. The implication is that before those terrible, retributive deaths by British military firing squads the Irish people as a whole were opposed to the “Rebels” and were accepting of the need to put down the “Rebellion”. But, as we have seen, nothing further could be from the truth.

The great failure of the British was not to have ignored the wishes of the Irish people and to have executed Pádraig Mac Piarais, President of the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Irish Republic, and all the other signatories to the Proclamation of the Irish Republic. Their failure was that they did listen to the wishes of the Irish people and their demands for violent retribution. Unfortunately it was the wrong Irish people. British military commanders and politicians, already convinced of the need for a public show of force through the killing of the leaders of the Rising, needed simply enough public encouragement and momentum to go through with it. In Britain there was plenty, with demands for blood from across the political spectrum. But they also found it in Ireland. Not from Irish Ireland: but from British Ireland. Amongst the British Unionist population who dominated the locally raised British military and paramilitary forces in Ireland, the judiciary, the colonial civil service and administration, the business classes and landed aristocracy, and above all the media elite of the time: journalists, editors and newspaper owners.

The Quays, Dublin, 1916

The British population of Ireland demanded that the British Empire seek retribution upon its and their enemies. By baying for the blood of the ”Rebels” the Unionists expressed their loyalty to the existing order while protecting and securing their own place in it. Many believed in the aftermath of the executions that Ireland’s position in the so-called “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland” had been secured forever. To some the insurrection had been a blessing in disguise and now the people of Britain would see the deceit and untrustworthiness of the “native, Catholic, Gaelic Irish” and that the limited reforms of the previous decades could be undone. Most expected the British to now impose military conscription upon Ireland in order to force tens of thousands of Irishmen into the ranks of the British Armed Forces to fight in the trenches of World War I and that the Nationalist politicians of Ireland would be rendered mute and even more ineffective than normal.

However, as we know, history took quite a different path. The British soon realised their mistake in listening to the advice of their “West British” co-nationals in Ireland, and within eight years the Unionist population in three-quarters of Ireland was abandoned to its own fate as the British colony in Ireland was reduced to a bloody rump centred in the north-eastern corner of the island where the single greatest concentration of an ethnically British population lived as a local majority. But that, as they say, is another story.

A group of British army officers pose beneath the statue of Parnell with the ‘Irish Republic’ flag that had flown over the GPO in O’Connell Street during the Easter Rising in 1916

Suggested Links

If you want to learn more about the Easter Rising of 1916, the National Library of Ireland maintains a permanent online exhibition, The 1916 Rising: Personalities and Perspectives. You can view the flash-site or view individual guides in PDF format here.

British troops moving near the Four Courts, after the Rising, Dublin, 1916

Some more interesting sites are:

The Irish Volunteers Commemorative Organisation

The War Of Independence

The Irish Story

The Irish War

The Easter Rising

An Chéad Dáil Éireann

The Irish Republic

The Proclamation of the Irish Republic: Notes From Dublin

The 1916 Rising: Then and Now

The Irish Rebellion of 1916 and its Martyrs: Erin’s tragic Easter

Sinn Féin Rebellion Handbook, Easter, 1916

The Pursuit of Sovereignty & the Impact of Partition, 1912–1949

The Foundation and Development of Na Fianna Éireann

British Troops Of The Ulster Volunteer Force, A Later Notorious British Unionist Militia In Ireland, Move Into Dublin To Support British Forces, 1916 – The Presence Of UVF Men Contributed To Anti-British Feeling In The Capital

British Occupation Forces, Dublin, 1916

Snipers Kneeling Behind Barricade, British Occupation Forces, Dublin, 1916

British Troops Seal-Off Dublin Streets during “Troubles”- Easter Rising, 1916

Soldiers Crawling Over Bridge, British Occupation Forces, Dublin, 1916

Irish Republican Army POWs, Easter Rising, Dublin, 1916

Irish Republican Army POWs, Easter Rising, Dublin, 1916

Countess Markievicz In Temporary Outside Cell, Held By British Occupation Forces, 1916 Easter Rising, Dublin

Defiant Dublin Children Left Homeless After The Bombardment Of The City By The British Occupation Forces, Dublin 1916